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panel or of the academies.
Simplifying Administration of Health Insurance 
 
Introduction 
 
 The high administrative costs of America’s health insurance system, with 
its thousands of insuring entities and over a million providers and practitioners, 
have been a focus of policy discussion for decades.  Advocates of single-payer 
options have often pointed to the lower costs in other countries’ systems or in 
our own Medicare program and have suggested that savings on administrative 
spending from adoption of universal public insurance could finance much of the 
cost of care for the uninsured.  Conversely, those who favor a reduced role for 
insurance in medical care financing—for example, through the promotion of 
high-deductible insurance plans—contend that this approach would save money 
because a third party would not be interposed in many routine consumer-
provider transactions. 
 
 In effect, both those views point toward a utopia of simplicity in which 
there would no insurance-related costs.  At one extreme might be, not universal 
insurance, but a claims-free system of budgets and salaries—perhaps the pre-
Thatcher British National Health Service. At the other extreme, all costs of health 
care would be paid directly by the consumer.  Some individual practitioners and 
entire sectors—for example, hearing aids and related care—still operate in this 
prelapsarian way. 
 
  This report assumes that, whatever shape health reform might take, there 
will still be at least one insurer, doing some of the things insurers currently do.  It 
begins with a review of some ways of defining or classifying administrative 
costs, both of insurers and of other participants in the system, and the 
fragmentary estimates of how large these costs are.  This is followed by a 
discussion of current efforts to reduce administrative costs, many of which have 
focused on standardizing and simplifying transactions among insurers, 
providers, and employers.   It then considers how various health care reform 
proposals, whether or not directly targeted at administrative costs, might 
reduce—or add to--the complexity of the current system.   
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Defining and classifying administrative costs 
 
Administrative costs of the health insurance system include (a) spending 
by public and private health insurers other than actual payments to providers 
and (b) costs incurred by other system participants, including providers, 
employers, and consumers, in dealing with insurers.  Identifying and estimating 
the second class of costs has proved elusive, but even the first is less clear-cut 
than it appears. 
 
In an influential 1992 article, Kenneth Thorpe suggested that 
administrative costs could be classified in terms of four functions or components 
and showed how they could be assigned to different sectors of the system (table 
1). 
 
Table 1.  Administrative Costs by Function and Sector of the US Health Care 
System 
 
Function/ 
component 
Health 
insurance 
Hospitals Nursing 
homes 
Physicians Firms Consumers/ 
individuals 
Transaction- 
related 
Claims 
processing 
Admitting, 
billing 
Admitting, 
billing 
Billing Tracking 
employee 
hires/ 
terminations 
Submitting 
claims 
Benefits 
management 
Statistical 
analyses, 
quality 
assistance 
[sic], plan 
design 
Management 
information 
systems 
Management 
information 
systems 
Management 
information 
systems 
Internal 
analyses 
Tracking 
expenses 
eligible for 
reimbursement 
Selling and 
marketing 
Underwriting, 
risk/ 
premiums, 
advertising 
Strategic 
planning, 
advertising 
Strategic 
planning 
Advertising Flexible 
benefit 
programs 
Search costs 
Regulatory/ 
compliance 
Premium 
taxes, reserve 
requirements 
Waste 
management 
Discharge 
planning 
Licensing 
requirements 
Filing 
summary 
plan 
descriptions, 
COBRA 
obligations 
Mandated 
benefit laws 
Source: Thorpe. 
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Some of the specific items or their placement may be open to question.1   
More important for the purpose of this paper, many of the costs cited, while 
clearly administrative, are not related to the insurance system.  For example, 
providers would advertise to attract patients even in an insurance-free, cash on 
the table system.  (Indeed, they might advertise more, because they could not 
rely on insurers to steer patients to them through network arrangements.)  Still, 
the formulation is useful in emphasizing that health insurance imposes costs on 
many different actors and that some of these are intangible opportunity costs—
such as the time spent by consumers in finding a health insurer and picking from 
among available benefit choices. 
 
Perhaps a simpler way of thinking about insurance-related administrative 
costs is to enumerate all the activities that people or organizations must perform 
that they would not perform in a cash-only universe.  As table 2 suggests, many 
of these can be characterized as transactions or as exchanges of information 
between two different parties in the system.  Other columns or rows could be 
added—for example, for transactions with government, as regulator or tax 
collector, and for the brand-new world of transactions with the financial 
institutions that hold health savings account deposits.  And there certainly might 
be more items in each cell. 
 
 
                                                 
1 For example, state mandated benefit laws impose costs on consumers by preventing them from 
selecting less extensive and less costly benefit packages, but it is hard to see how these are 
administrative costs.  And some provider functions, such as waste management, might easily be 
classed as patient care rather than administration. 
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Table 2.  Insurance-related transactions or information exchanges 
 Employer Insurer or ASO 
(agents/brokers 
may be involved 
in some 
functions) 
Provider 
Consumer Plan selection, 
enrollment, 
status changes. 
Payroll 
deduction. 
Complaint 
resolution. 
COBRA. 
Marketing, 
nongroup plan 
selection and 
enrollment. 
Underwriting. 
Process, 
reimburse non-
assigned claims. 
EOBs. 
Info about 
covered 
dependents.  
Grievances, 
appeals. 
 
Obtain insurance 
information. 
Collect copays, 
balance billing. 
Provide/obtain 
required referrals. 
Provide info 
needed by 
consumer for non-
assigned claim. 
Employer (other 
than employer 
acting as insurer) 
 Select, contract 
with insurer(s). 
Provide 
enrollment, 
status change 
info. 
Pay premiums. 
May require 
quality, P4P, or 
other reporting.  
[Some possible 
contacts in the 
context of 
worker’s 
compensation 
claims, which will 
not be considered 
here] 
Insurer (includes 
self-insured 
employer or its 
administrative 
service 
organization, 
ASO) 
 Insurer-to-
insurer: 
coordination of 
benefits 
Contracting, price 
negotiation. 
Verify insurance 
enrollment, 
service coverage.  
Credentialing. 
Claims.  Pre-
authorization, UR, 
and disease 
management.  
Quality and P4P 
reporting. 
 
In an insurance-free world, the table would have only one cell—
provider/consumer—and there would only be one kind of transaction, billing 
and collection.  Even this would be dramatically simplified: the bill might just 
read “Saw Mrs. Jones, $150.”  In a world with just one insurer, such as a 
Canadian provincial health plan, the employer column would disappear (unless 
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private supplementary coverage were permitted, an important qualification to be 
discussed later).  In a multi-insurer world with employer-based coverage, all the 
cells remain.  The goal of simplification in this context is to eliminate some of the 
transactions in a given cell or make it possible to complete them more easily or 
expeditiously. 
 
Estimates of Administrative Costs 
 
There are numerous estimates of the administrative costs of health plans 
and public insurance programs, as well as a few attempts to estimate costs borne 
by providers and employers.  This section begins with the most commonly cited 
figures, those in the National Health Expenditures (NHE) series developed by 
the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS).  It then briefly 
summarizes some of the other estimates of private insurance and provider costs.  
More details of individual results are furnished in the appendix. 
National Health Expenditures 
 
The NHE has a category denoted as “administrative costs and net costs of 
private insurance.”  For public programs, such as Medicare and Medicaid, the 
figure is derived from Treasury documents, additional CMS data, and state 
reports.  The private insurance figure, constructed from a variety of sources, is 
meant to equal total premium revenue minus benefit payments; it thus includes 
administrative costs, other expenses such as taxes, and surplus or profit.  Non-
premium revenues, such as investment income, are omitted (CMS 2006).2
 
Figure 1 shows the NHE estimates for private insurance and Medicare 
from 1966 through 2005.  The numbers are administrative costs and profit as a 
percent of total costs.  Note that the NHE does not include estimates of provider 
administrative costs. 
 
                                                 
2 The sources do not include data on administrative costs of self-insured plans, such as fees paid 
to administrative service organizations.  These costs are implicitly present, because the method 
incorporates total benefit/cost ratios derived from insurance company data, but they may be 
overstated to the extent that the ratio is lower in large, self-insured plans than under commercial 
coverage. 
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Figure 1.  Administrative Costs and Net Cost of Private Insurance as a 
Percent of Total Cost, 1996-2005 
 
 
Source: CMS National Health Expenditures series, available at 
http://www.cms.hhs.gov/NationalHealthExpendData/downloads/nhe2006.zip.  
 
As America’s Health Insurance Plans (AHIP)  have pointed out, the 
private insurance number varies considerably, ranging from 9% to 15% over the 
years (Lemieux).  This may reflect fluctuations in profitability.  Health insurance 
was long thought to be subject to a 6-year “underwriting cycle,” with years of 
higher profits followed by years of lower ones.  This cycle has clearly moderated 
in recent years, and some analysts contend it no longer exists.  One possible 
factor is increasing consolidation in the health insurance industry, an issue to be 
considered below.  Declining competition in many markets may make it easier 
for insurers to pass rising benefit costs to purchasers instead of accepting 
reduced profit margins. 
 
The total Medicare estimate includes payments to Medicare Advantage 
plans, and the Medicare administrative costs include the administrative 
component of MA plan bids—on average, about 8% of the bid.3  If MA costs are 
excluded, administrative costs for original Medicare in 2005 drop from the 3% 
shown in the figure to about 2%.  Implementation of the new Part D prescription 
drug program in 2006 has probably increased Medicare’s administrative cost 
percentage, but estimates are not yet available.  
  
                                                 
3 Personal communication, Anne B. Martin, CMS, to Paul van de Water, NASI, October 2007. 
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Some analysts believe that the Medicare figures are understated, or that 
comparisons between Medicare and private insurance are inappropriate, for 
various reasons (Litow; Zycher; Lemieux): 
 
• The NHE estimates fail to allocate to Medicare some program-related 
costs incurred by other federal agencies (such as prosecution of Medicare 
fraud by the Justice Department or policymaking by Congress, equivalent 
to private insurance management).  While this is true, analysts’ attempts 
to allocate these outside costs are not very persuasive. 
 
• Medicare has lower claims processing costs relative to benefit costs than 
private insurance, because the average Medicare claim is larger.  This is 
definitely not true of inpatient care—beneficiaries have more discharges at 
a lower cost per discharge—and probably not for other services.  On the 
other hand, it is the case that Medicare’s fixed costs are being compared to 
a larger amount of aggregate benefit spending, resulting in a lower 
percentage. 
 
• Medicare spends too little on valuable administrative activities such as 
disease management, member education, and customer service. 
 
Whatever the merit of these objections, it is clear that private insurers 
incur some costs, such as for marketing and underwriting, that are not incurred 
by public programs.  And of course even nonprofit health plans seek to achieve 
some surplus, as a cushion against future losses or to fund capital spending.  
Whether profits should be included in estimates of administrative cost is 
debatable.  Some of the estimates described in the next section include profit and 
others do not. 
 
Some analysts also attempt comparisons of US administrative costs, 
drawn from the NHE and other sources.  The appendix discusses one frequently 
cited study comparing costs in the US and Canada. 
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Private insurance administrative costs 
 
Estimates of insurance costs are derived from surveys of insurers or from 
insurer filings with state insurance departments.  Total costs for Blue Cross plans 
and commercial insurers across all lines of business, not including profit or 
surplus, tend to be about 12% of premiums.  (One lower estimate in the appendix 
excludes some sales costs.)  Although there is a longstanding perception that 
HMOs have higher costs because of their more intensive care management 
activities, one study of the Blues’ commercial business found that HMOs’ costs 
were actually slightly below those for indemnity/PPO plans and higher than 
those for POS plans.  This may because all types of plans have now adopted 
some HMO-like management practices. 
 
Breaking down insurers’ costs is quite difficult, because each of the 
available studies has a different way of categorizing functional components.  
Very roughly, claims processing and customer service account for 2% to 4% of 
premiums.  Direct sales and marketing expenses, including underwriting costs, 
are 3% to 4% of premiums, although one study that tries to estimate the share of 
non-marketing cost centers that might be considered as marketing-related gives 
an indirect marketing cost estimate of 8%.  State premium tax rates range from 
zero to 4.3%, but are commonly in the 2% to 3% range (ARC).  These taxes are 
sometimes waived for the Blues and are never paid by self-insured employers. 
 
Administrative costs are much higher for small employer groups—often 
in the range of 20% to 30% of premiums—than for larger ones, for several 
reasons.  First, marketing costs are higher.  While larger groups commonly deal 
directly with the insurer, small groups are enrolled by agents and brokers who 
are paid on commission.4  Second, because expenses for small groups are difficult 
to predict, insurers often demand higher risk reserves.  Third, small group 
carriers in most states still engage in underwriting, with its attendant costs, to set 
each group’s premium rate.  For all these reasons, costs in the nongroup market 
may be even higher, although there are no reliable data. 
 
Larger employers who self-insure generally contract with insurers or 
other third party administrators on an administrative services only (ASO) basis.  
Blue Cross ASO charges range from 8% to 9% of total health benefit spending; 
non-insurer third party administrators may charge less.  In either case, costs are 
lower than for insured groups of the same size, because marketing expenses are 
negligible, the plan pays no premium taxes, and the contractor establishes no risk 
reserves.  In addition, the employers themselves usually perform some functions, 
                                                 
4 Agents typically sell the products of one insurance company, while brokers offer several 
carriers’ products. 
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such as processing enrollments and collecting premiums, that would otherwise 
be performed by an insurer. 
Provider costs 
 
Overall administrative costs for physicians are in the range of 25%-30% of 
practice revenues.  Hospital administrative costs appear to be slightly lower, 
although the distinction between patient care and administrative costs may be 
fuzzy.  Separating out insurance-related costs is difficult—especially for 
physician offices, where the same employee may be scheduling appointments 
(non-insurance), obtaining coverage information from patients (insurance), and 
so on.   
 
For physicians, one study found costs related to claims and utilization 
management amounting to 10% of practice revenues.  Another study, which 
estimated insurance-related costs in more cost centers and included an estimate 
of physicians’ time spent on insurance matters, estimated costs for a primary care 
office of 15% of revenues.  
 
 For hospitals, insurance-related costs may be in the range of 7% to 11% of 
total patient revenues.  It should be noted, however, that the available studies are 
all based on costs in California.  Total hospital spending in California, per capita, 
was $1,613 in 2004, compared to a national average of $1,931.5  If fixed costs are 
being spread across smaller total revenues in California than elsewhere, they 
might be higher as a percent of revenues than national averages. 
 
Employer costs 
 
Larger employers—those with 200 or more workers—often perform 
enrollment and premium collection functions that would otherwise be 
performed by an insurer or ASO contractor.  A study in 2000 estimated that these 
employers were spending $250 per covered worker to administer health benefits 
(Kaiser/HRET).  This would have been about 10% of health benefit costs for 
single coverage and 4% of costs for family coverage in that year.  (This assumes 
that the employer’s administrative costs are about the same for both coverage 
types.)  As compensation of human resources personnel has probably not kept 
pace with rising health care costs, these percentages are likely to have dropped in 
more recent years. 
 
                                                 
5 NHE estimate, available at 
http://www.cms.hhs.gov/NationalHealthExpendData/downloads/res-us.pdf. 
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Simplifying insurance-related transactions 
 
There has been substantial progress toward standardization of provider-
insurer and employer-insurer information exchanges, partly spurred by the 1996 
enactment of the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA).  
While HIPAA has now been largely implemented, there remain many 
complications and some areas in which uniformity remains a distant goal.  Less 
has been done to simplify transactions between consumers and the other actors, 
partly because most efforts have focused on electronic exchanges to which 
consumers are rarely a party.  (This could well change, as it is easy to imagine 
that some consumers will eventually expect to be able to perform some functions 
on-line, such as adding a dependent to their coverage or filing a non-assigned 
claim.) 
 
It is important to distinguish the information exchanges discussed in this 
section, which involve insurance-related transactions, from electronic health 
information (EHI) exchange among different providers.  There is currently 
considerable interest in the development of computerized medical records and 
interoperability standards that would allow exchange of these records among 
providers, to improve coordination, reduce medical errors, and so on.  While 
insurance-related exchange and EHI are not entirely unrelated—for example, 
information needed to file a claim could be derived from a medical record 
entry—EHI is a much grander and more difficult undertaking than the measures 
considered here. 
 
Pre-HIPAA initiatives   
 
Standardization began with the development of uniform claims forms.  
Work in this area began in 1968, just after the implementation of Medicare and 
Medicaid.  The first standard form, the UB-82 for institutional services, was 
finally approved by the National Uniform Billing Committee in 1982; its 
successor, the UB-92, is now in more or less universal use.  The parallel form for 
practitioner services was the HCFA-1500 (now the NUCC-1500, for the National 
Uniform Claim Committee).   
 
While many payers and providers adopted these paper forms, their use 
was by no means universal, and the transition to electronic billing and payment 
was hindered by the existence of numerous different processing systems, each 
with its own expectations about what fields needed to be completed and how 
data were to be coded.  Private and sometimes public clearinghouses emerged—
in effect, translation services that converted data submitted by one party to the 
form preferred by the other and, as necessary, requested additional needed 
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information.  The American National Standards Institute (ANSI) and other 
organizations began to develop uniform data standards, but their adoption was 
voluntary.  A 1995 survey of insurers found that, while 55% of insurers could 
accept some claims electronically, they were using data sets from different 
standard-setting organizations or proprietary systems of their own (HIAA).  
Meanwhile, there were still many payers, and many more providers, who 
continued to use only paper forms. 
 
There were some state-level efforts to encourage or impose 
standardization.  In New York, the state health department, with funding from 
the Robert Wood Johnson Foundation, established Universal New York Health 
Care in 1990 (Beauchamp and Rouse).  Under UNY-Care, all hospitals in one 
region of the state were to submit their claims to a single entity (actually two 
contracting clearinghouses), which would pay the claims and then obtain 
reimbursement from insurers.6  The initiative was voluntary and ended with the 
expiration of the grant in 1993.  The following year, New York passed a law 
phasing in a requirement that all providers submit claims electronically and 
developed its own standard forms.  (Maryland passed a similar law in 1993, but 
repealed it after realizing that providers were incapable of complying; cited, 
Maine Task Force.) 
 
In Utah, the Utah Health Information Network (UHIN) was established in 
1993 as a voluntary coalition of government, payers, and providers.  Initial 
participants contributed start-up funding, and data standards were developed by 
consensus.  UHIN now functions as the clearinghouse for eligibility, claims, and 
other transactions between over 450 payers (including Medicare and Medicaid) 
and 100% of Utah hospitals and 90% of Utah physicians.  Providers pay an 
annual membership fee, while payers pay a per transaction fee.  The program is 
now working toward clinical data interchange (Sundwall). 
 
Under a 1994 law, Minnesota required insurers, providers, and employers 
who used electronic data interchange to conform to a set of state-developed 
specifications based on ANSI standards.  No one was required to submit claims 
or other transactions electronically; only parties that chose to do so were subject 
to the standards (Maine Task Force).  A 2007 law will require electronic filing by 
2009.7
 
                                                 
6 This was known as the “single payer demonstration,” but only in the sense that all providers 
were sending their claims to one mailing address. 
7 Minnesota Statutes 2007, Chapter 62J.536. 
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HIPAA and ASCA   
 
HIPAA, enacted in 1996, required the Secretary of HHS to develop 
standard forms and uniform data elements for electronic transmission of nine 
common transactions: 
 
• Health claims or equivalent encounter information; 
• Health claims attachments [i.e., detailed information on conditions or 
procedures needed for adjudication of a claim]; 
• Enrollment and disenrollment in a health plan; 
• Eligibility for a health plan; 
• Health care payment and remittance advice; 
• Health plan premium payments; 
• First report of injury [for workers’ compensation cases]; 
• Health claim status; 
• Referral certification and authorization. 
 
All health plans and health care clearinghouses would have to accept 
electronic transactions in standard format from any employer or provider.  Note 
that the rule was one-way.  Plans had to accept standardized transactions; that is, 
they could not refuse electronic submissions or impose alternate formats.  But the 
standards applied to employers and providers only if they chose to submit 
transactions electronically.  Providers could still choose to do all their business 
on paper.   
 
To date, standards have been finalized for all the transactions except first 
report of injury and health claims attachments; the latter raise difficult issues, to 
be considered below.  After a complicated phase-in, compliance with the 
published standards is now mandatory for all covered entities. 
 
 The Secretary was also required to develop unique health identifiers for 
individuals, employers, health plans, and health care providers.  Identifiers for 
health plans and providers have been adopted, and use will be fully mandatory 
by mid-2008.  A proposed rule on health plan identifiers has been postponed, 
and Congress has since 1998 repeatedly specified that HHS appropriations may 
not be used to develop individual identifiers, because of privacy concerns and 
also because some people viewed an individual ID as providing “a key element 
needed for a government takeover of health care (Armey).” 
 
In 2001, the Administrative Simplification Compliance Act (ASCA) 
required all Medicare providers and suppliers to submit Medicare claims 
electronically and in compliance with HIPAA standards by October 2003.  While 
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the rule applies only to Medicare, possibly providers shifting to electronic filing 
for one payer would be more prone to do so for others.  However, providers with 
fewer than 25 employees and practitioners or other suppliers with fewer than 10 
employees are exempt.8  This exception exempts an estimated 71% of physician 
offices and 69% of home health agencies (CMS 2003). 
 
Progress and barriers 
 
Even before HIPAA, large payers and providers had made considerable 
progress in electronic claims processing.  Surveys by AHIP and its predecessor 
HIAA have found that the percent of claims submitted electronically went from 
2% in 1990 to 40% in 1999 and 44% in 2002 (AHIP 2006a).  Of the one billion 
claims submitted to Medicare in FY 2002, before the effective date of ASCA, all 
but 13.9 percent were submitted electronically (CMS 2003).  As of 2006, the AHIP 
survey finds that 75% of claims to private insurers were submitted electronically.  
This might indicate that HIPAA and ASCA accelerated the move to electronic 
claims, but also suggests that there is still limited take-up by small providers and 
practices.  There are no equivalent data for other key HIPAA transactions, such 
as transmission of enrollment data by employers and eligibility verification.  
 
Payers and providers are also working outside the HIPAA framework to 
further expedite common transactions.  The Council on Affordable Quality 
Healthcare (CAQH) has developed standards for real-time verification of 
eligibility and benefits and certifies vendors whose systems meet those 
standards.  Providers who use one of the certified vendors can obtain coverage 
information from any of the health plans participating in the program.   
 
Some individual insurers have developed systems, available to their 
network providers only at this point, that move beyond verification toward 
something resembling real-time claims adjudication.  In CIGNA’s HealthePass 
program, for example, the provider swipes a member ID card, enters the 
procedures performed, and learns immediately what will be paid and the 
amount of the patient’s liability.  (Humana has a similar system.)  As with a 
credit card charge, the transaction is processed for payment without a further 
claim from the provider.  The service is promoted as especially useful for 
patients with health savings accounts (HSAs); the insurer ID card can function as 
a debit card that draws the required patient contribution from the patient’s 
                                                 
8 In Medicare parlance, “providers” include hospitals, home health agencies, ESRD facilities, and 
SNFs; practitioners and suppliers include physicians, ambulatory surgical centers, clinical labs, 
and all other practitioners. 
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account.  More controversially, for non-HSA patients the ID can function as a 
credit card, with patient liability added to a running debt balance. 
 
There are also efforts to address transactions not yet subject to HIPAA 
standardization.  For example, CAQH has developed a universal credentialing 
database.  Providers anywhere in the US can enter credentialing information on a 
single standard form, and participating plans and hospitals can use this 
information for initial applications, re-credentialing, and other functions.  At 
least one state is reportedly working on its own to develop a unique patient 
identifier, the original HIPAA goal blocked by congressional action.9
 
Whatever further progress may be made by private groups or state 
governments, the HIPAA process has revealed at least two key barriers to 
simplification.    
 
 First, the HIPAA standards do not establish absolute uniformity in payers’ 
systems.  Standards for a particular transaction specify a set of fields, formats, 
and a range of possible entries for the field.  But a health plan may require that 
certain fields be completed, forbid the completion of others, and specify that only 
certain codes are valid within a given field.  These requirements are spelled out 
in “companion documents” issued by individual payers.  (One organization has 
compiled over 1,000 of these documents.)10  Even Medicare carriers in different 
regions issue separate companion documents.  This means that, despite HIPAA, 
even the largest providers are continuing to rely on clearinghouses to format and 
transmit their data to multiple payers. 
 
 Second, there may be some amount of irreducible complexity in 
insurance-related transactions.  Some kinds of transactions are comparatively 
straightforward. In the case of pharmacy services, the claim is for a particular 
quantity of a drug with a specific NDC code, and the payer can write simple 
decision rules for each code.  (This is why real-time adjudication is already a 
reality for drug benefits.)  For other kinds of services, pre-authorization or claims 
processing may require more extensive communications between provider and 
payer.  Payers may require detailed information on patient medical history, 
diagnostic test results, or past treatment to make coverage decisions.  These 
information exchanges are the subject of the key HIPAA-specified transaction for 
which final standards have not yet been issued, claims attachments.  Part of the 
                                                 
9 Hawaii, as reported by NASCIO, but not otherwise verifiable.  Note that a single-state 
individual ID may be more practicable in Hawaii than elsewhere, because patients are not 
typically crossing state lines for care. 
10 Claredi estimate, 
https://www.claredi.com/solutions/payerCompanion.php?PHPSESSID=f93575120f26e92004d4
983faad9f5a9, accessed June 2008. 
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problem is that much of the information needed cannot be readily reduced to a 
few codes on a standard form, and that few providers would be capable of 
coding the information even if such a form could be devised.  (The CMS draft 
rules would have required insurers to accept scanned documents, natural 
language text, or coded information, whichever the provider chose; CMS 2005.)   
 
Even if forms and coding could be standardized, these transactions are 
likely to continue to require staff or professional time at both ends.  Payers have 
to be able to say exactly what they need, the provider has to figure out what to 
send and extract the specific information needed, and the payer has to manually 
review what was sent and determine if further information is needed.11  It is not 
certain how many claims can be processed simply and routinely and how many 
require some further information.  In its proposed rule, CMS cited a 1993 
estimate by the Workgroup for Electronic Data Interchange that 25% of all health 
care claims require additional documentation; CMS guessed that half these 
documentation requests might be met by the standard formats it was proposing.  
Some commenters on the rule contended that these estimates were too high. 
Policy options 
 
Policymakers could take a number of steps to simplify or expedite 
insurance-related transactions.   
 
National clearinghouse.  There is an entire industry of private 
clearinghouses that function as intermediaries between payers and providers, 
and some states are following Utah in developing a statewide clearinghouse 
system.  However, no single clearinghouse can yet undertake to match every 
provider with every payer.  Even Utah’s system, which includes every in-state 
insurer, can process transactions for people covered by some out-of-state insurers 
but not others.  Wicks, Meyer, and Silow-Carroll have suggested that there 
should be a single national clearinghouse.  All insurers and health plans would 
have to participate, and ongoing operations would be funded by contributions 
from insurers and self-insured employer plans.  Health plans would issue 
enrollees a standardized card, resembling the CIGNA HealthePass, which could 
be read by any provider. 
 
This would certainly fill some of the holes in the current ad hoc system, 
and might be especially helpful in streamlining coordination-of-benefit 
transactions involving more than one insurer.  To be fully effective, however, it 
                                                 
11 This iterative process might at least be shortened if providers could simply send every record 
they had about the patient.  But a total record dump would violate HIPAA privacy requirements, 
a source of complexity beyond the scope of this paper. 
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would need to resolve some of the HIPAA problems discussed earlier, and there 
might still be many small providers operating outside the electronic universe.  In 
addition, insurers might question why they should bear the entire funding 
burden.  (Currently providers pay clearinghouses; anecdotally, the charge is 
somewhere in the range of 15 to 20 cents a claim, or more if the provider submits 
paper documents or its submissions need extensive massaging.  Providers must 
also pay the clearinghouse to receive a remittance advice back from the insurer.) 
 
Require electronic filing.  As noted earlier, ASCA applies only to 
Medicare transactions, and a large number of small providers and suppliers are 
exempt.  Minnesota’s new universal electronic transaction law has no such 
exemption, and federal law could similarly apply to all providers and all payers.  
(Possibly the law could be limited to some subset of common transactions, such 
as eligibility inquiries—perhaps the easiest—and claims not requiring 
attachments.)  Such a rule would place an initial investment burden on small 
providers, but they would save money over time.  And ultimately, if the larger 
goal of electronic health interchange is ever to be achieved, all providers are 
going to have to enter the computer age sooner or later. 
 
Fully standardize transactions.  One drawback to a universal filing 
requirement is the continuing non-uniformity of payers’ implementation of 
HIPAA.  Given the current situation, it may seem unduly burdensome to compel 
small providers to pay a clearinghouse to deal with complexities that were 
created by payers.  Minnesota’s law requires everyone to conform to a set of 
standard coding rules developed by the state and explicitly forbids payers to 
issue companion documents or other supplemental instructions.  Why couldn’t 
HIPAA standards go further, so that all providers and payers used identical 
coding and no intermediary translator was necessary?  One obvious answer is 
cost: it is less expensive for both sides to pay a clearinghouse than to modify 
existing systems.  In addition, shifting to a new, uniform system could require 
redesign of internal processes, not just external transactions, and possibly render 
institutions’ pre-redesign data unusable.  Another factor may be that payers’ 
coding rules can embody policies, rather than just data formats—for example, 
rules about coverage of assistant surgeons or physician extenders, or about 
which services may be billed separately and which may be bundled (Vermont 
Commission). 
 
Some people would argue that consolidation in the health insurance 
industry could gradually make any of these large government initiatives less 
necessary or urgent.  One recent study found that the Blue Cross Blue Shield 
plans (including the large multistate plans) and three major non-Blues carriers 
(Aetna, CIGNA, and UnitedHealth) control more than 60% of the market in 34 
states and more than 70% in 23 states (Robinson).  This means that, for many 
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providers, a substantial majority of their claims are going to just a few payers 
(including the local Medicare carrier and Medicaid agency or intermediary).  The 
author contends that consolidation is likely to continue, as the big plans swallow 
little ones, new plans face barriers to market entry, and for other reasons.  
Whatever the overall advantages or disadvantages of industry concentration, it is 
clearly easier for providers and clearinghouses to deal with a few plans, rather 
than many. 
 
Reform proposals with implications for administrative complexity 
or costs 
 
 So far this paper has focused on measures intended to streamline 
insurance-related transactions.  Generally, these measures do not actually 
eliminate any transactions, but merely make them easier and (perhaps) less 
costly to conduct.  However, there are also numerous proposals that would 
change the way the insurance market operates and that have implications for 
administrative costs of insurers, employers, or consumers.  Some of these 
proposals target administrative costs directly.  Others are offered in the context 
of general health care reform plans but incidentally might have some effect, 
whether or not intended, on insurance-related administrative costs. 
 
This section considers the possible administrative effects of seven 
proposals or components of proposals that might affect administrative costs and 
complexity.  The list is meant only to include ideas that have received 
widespread discussion and/or support: each of the ideas was endorsed by one or 
more of the original field of 2008 Democratic and Republican presidential 
contenders.  (Two elements of many plans that would obviously affect 
administrative costs and complexity—premium subsidies and employer or 
individual mandates—are omitted here because they are the subject of other 
papers for this project.)  The discussion here considers only the proposals’ 
administrative implications and not their likely effects on improving access to 
coverage, control of health care spending, or other goals. 
 
Open FEHBP or similar exchange to general public   
 
Some proposals would either open the Federal Employees Health Benefits 
Program (FEHBP) to individuals or small groups or would create a similar 
national program or set of regional programs.  While these proposals are chiefly 
intended to assure access to insurance and provide a range of coverage choices, 
their proponents also tend to assume that they would reduce administrative 
costs.   
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The Office of Personnel Management (OPM) spent $27 million—less than 
one-tenth of 1% of total FEHBP spending—to administer the program in 2007 
(OMB).  However, OPM only negotiates and oversees carrier contracts and 
directly processes enrollment transactions for federal annuitants.  The other 
functions of a large employer, such as processing new enrollments and 
enrollment changes and collecting and transmitting employee and employer 
premium contributions, are performed by the employing agencies.  Costs are in 
each agency’s budget for personnel operations.  In addition, administrative costs 
for each participating carrier are included in premiums.  OPM estimated in 2003 
that Blue Cross and the other national plans spent about 7 percent of premiums 
on administration (Block).  The figure for HMOs is probably comparable to their 
administrative loading for their other large group business.  Based on the 
estimates supplied earlier, combined total FEHBP administrative costs might be 
in the range of 15%, roughly the same as those for other very large groups. 
 
Costs would certainly be higher if FEHBP or a similar exchange had to 
deal with a great many small groups or individual enrollees.  Whether they 
would approach the 25% range typical of small group coverage would depend 
on several factors.  Marketing costs would be lower if most applicants dealt 
directly with the exchange.  However, as Wicks has pointed out, most state-level 
exchanges have wound up paying commissions to agents and brokers.  All the 
proposals assume guaranteed issue and at least adjusted community rating, so 
underwriting costs would be reduced or disappear (at the price of possible 
adverse selection, unless similar rules were imposed in the non-exchange 
market).  At least at the outset, however, carriers would likely demand much 
higher risk reserves, as they faced hordes of new enrollees for whom no 
experience data were available.  Overall, the expectation that an exchange could 
reduce administrative costs may depend on an assumption of some economies of 
scale that might or might not materialize. 
 
Guaranteed issue and community rating   
 
Some proposals would establish some form of federal standards 
governing the underwriting and rating practices of all insurers, rather than just 
those participating in an exchange arrangement.  Whatever their effects on 
general costs and availability, these options could be expected to reduce insurers’ 
administrative costs to the extent that they eliminate the practice of examining 
applicants’ health status or claims history.   
 
While underwriting costs cannot be isolated in any of the available 
studies, they might be 2% or more of total premiums for small group and 
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nongroup carriers.  In addition, agents and brokers may sometimes function as 
the first line in underwriting, screening out some applicants and obtaining health 
information about others.  These functions are implicitly included in 
commissions—and sometimes explicitly, if an insurer rewards agents for sending 
on only insurable applicants. 
 
Savings on underwriting costs would materialize only if insurers were 
required to use full community rating (no premium variation for any reason) or 
adjusted community rating (premium variation based on geographic or 
demographic factors, but not health status).  If instead the federal or state rules 
involve rating bands—allowing some specified percentage variation in rates 
based on health status or a combination of factors including health status—then 
insurers would continue to evaluate individuals, and there might be no 
underwriting savings. 
 
Minimum loss ratio 
 
Some people have proposed establishing a fixed minimum loss ratio, 
perhaps 85%, for health insurance plans.  That is, 85 cents of every premium 
dollar would have to be paid out in benefits, meaning that administrative costs 
and profits could not exceed 15% of premiums.12  Many states have set minimum 
loss ratios for small group or nongroup coverage or for specific classes of plans, 
such as HMOs, but usually at much lower levels, such as 55% to 65%.  In some 
states, there is no absolute rule, but plans meeting a specified limit are deemed to 
have “reasonable” rates, while plans not meeting it will be subject to greater 
scrutiny.  Federal law requires that Medicare supplemental policies, or Medigap, 
have a minimum loss ratio of 65% for individual policies and 75% for group 
policies.13
 
The available estimates of insurer costs would suggest that an 85% loss 
ratio in the individual and small group markets is simply unattainable, even if 
insurers were to forgo any profit at all.  Possibly some major insurers could meet 
the target if they were allowed to average their losses across all lines of business, 
including large group.  But large employers would simply be driven to self-
insure if they were expected to cross-subsidize administrative costs in the other 
market sectors.  Conceivably a national minimum loss ratio set at some lower 
                                                 
12 At least two recent state reform proposals, Gov. Rendell’s proposal for Pennsylvania and Gov. 
Schwarzenegger’s for California, had similar provisions. 
13 The Children’s Health and Medicare Protection Act of 2007 as passed by the House would have 
reduced payments for, and ultimately terminated contracts with, Medicare Advantage plans that 
had a loss ratio below 85%.  The provision was dropped, along with all Medicare provisions, in 
the conference agreement on the SCHIP legislation. 
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level could squeeze out excess administrative costs and profits in states that that 
have not already imposed these requirements.  However, while loss ratios may 
be useful to regulators and buyers as general guidelines for assessing the 
reasonableness of insurers’ premium rates, there are several arguments against 
fixed loss ratio rules.14
 
First, a minimum loss ratio potentially penalizes an insurer that is 
controlling health benefit costs through added administrative activities, such as 
utilization review, case management, or value-based selection of network 
providers.  If insurer A spends $850 on benefits and $150 on administration, 
while insurer B spends $750 on benefits and $200 on administration, it is the 
more “efficient” insurer B that fails an 85% test.  (Of course, B could also fail the 
test if it wrongly denied valid claims.)  Second, there are numerous problems of 
accounting and of comparison across carriers.  Which activities are clearly 
administrative as opposed to patient care-related?  What if some administrative 
costs borne by insurers in the small group market are shifted to employers in the 
large group market?  How should reinsurance and claims reserves be treated?  
Finally, loss ratios can fluctuate over time, because of unpredictable changes in 
utilization or provider charges; a minimum ratio is especially problematic if it is 
applied over a limited time period to every block of business an insurer sells.  
Single payer   
 
A single payer plan would obviously produce savings in both health plan 
administrative costs and provider transaction costs, with the possible trade-offs 
in access or care management cited by critics of this approach.  Whatever the 
overall pros and cons of single-payer proposals, it is important to note that there 
are several single-payer models with different potential effects on administrative 
complexity.   
 
Some plans, such as H.R. 676 (Conyers), would be on the Canadian model, 
with global budgets for hospitals and fee-for-service payment to practitioners; 
there would be no patient cost-sharing for covered services.  Staff-model HMOs 
could contract to provide care on a capitated basis, but no other insurers could 
participate, and they would be permitted to offer supplemental policies only for 
non-covered services such as cosmetic surgery.  On the other hand, Rep. Stark’s 
plan (H.R. 1841) would provide Medicare for all.15  Providers would be paid 
under current systems, with modifications, and beneficiaries required to pay 
cost-sharing, again with some changes from current rules.  Insurers could sell the 
                                                 
14 For an overview, see American Academy of Actuaries 1998. 
15 Some proposals would provide voluntary universal access to Medicare or another public 
program.  These are not single-payer proposals, because buyers could instead choose to obtain 
private coverage outside the program.  (See, for example, Anderson 2007.)   
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equivalent of Medigap supplemental plans; employers could provide 
supplemental coverage; and private health plans could contract to provide 
covered benefits in the same way as Medicare Advantage plans (except program 
payments would be limited to average fee-for-service costs).   
 
The Conyers plan would eliminate billing by hospitals; other providers 
would still have to bill for services, but would not have to collect patient cost-
sharing or deal with supplemental insurers.  Under the Stark approach, 
providers would still have to deal with contracting private health plans, 
incurring costs for eligibility verification, credentialing, claims filing, and so on, 
as well as with supplemental carriers and employer groups.  And consumers—
including those now in employer groups, frequently offered no choice of health 
plans—would have to perform the complicated tasks that now sometimes baffle 
Medicare beneficiaries, such as choosing from an array of coverage options and 
(for those selecting supplemental coverage) deciphering explanations of benefits 
from two payers for the same service.  The plan would thus retain some of the 
complexity of the current system. 
 
Reinsurance   
 
Several proposals seek to hold down premiums by providing federal 
reinsurance for all insurers or for some subset, such as retiree health plans.  All of 
these plans involve reimbursement of catastrophic losses on specific cases, rather 
than aggregate stop-loss coverage, and thus entail at least administrative costs 
for the review of individual claims.  In addition, as Wicks has noted, reinsurance 
is difficult to administer fairly if participating plans have different benefit 
packages.  Suppose, for example, that the catastrophic threshold is $25,000 and a 
patient incurs $35,000 in total costs.  If the patient is in a plan with a $1,000 
deductible, the insurer will spend $34,000 and the reinsurance will pay out 
$9,000.  If the patient is in a plan with no deductible, the insurer will spend 
$35,000 and the reinsurance will pay out $10,000.  This problem could arise 
under any proposal that does not combine reinsurance with benefit 
standardization. 
 
 There are some options for addressing this problem, but at the expense of 
greater complexity.  One would be for the reinsurance program to apply its 
catastrophic threshold to total spending, by both the insurer and the enrollee; 
this would provide equal subsidies for people with equal costs, regardless of the 
specifics of their benefit package.  A second option would be to recalculate the 
insurer’s costs using a sort of virtual standard benefit: what would the insurer 
have paid out if the deductible were x and the coinsurance were y?  Either of 
these approaches might effectively require the reinsurer (or the claiming primary 
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insurer) to recalculate every single claim, doubling the claims processing costs 
for high-cost enrollees. 
 
Interstate sale of insurance and association plans   
 
Proposals for interstate sale would allow a health plan licensed in any one 
state to sell coverage in all other states under the rules of the licensing state.  
Proposals for association plans would exempt insurers selling coverage to 
groups of multiple employers or other affinity groups from various state rules 
governing the small group market, such as benefit mandates or restrictions on 
premium variation.  Both types of proposals are really focused on reducing 
benefit costs for all buyers (by eliminating mandates or by allowing multiple 
groups to bargain jointly) or for low-risk groups (by eliminating rating 
restrictions).  However, there are also claims that these approaches would reduce 
administrative complexity and costs.  
 
 Interstate sale would reduce insurers’ administrative costs by eliminating 
the need to deal with multiple state regulators.  Underwriting costs would 
probably rise, assuming insurers would make their home in states with the least 
restrictive enrollment and rating requirements.  Supporters of this approach 
contend that it would also have more general effects on insurers’ administrative 
costs and profits by promoting national competition.  However, it is uncertain 
how creation of a national market would play out.  It might accelerate 
consolidation of the insurance market, perhaps leading to smaller administrative 
costs but higher profit margins. 
 
 The effects of allowing association plans are unclear.  As Wicks has noted, 
the association must have substantial enrollment to achieve any economies of 
scale in administrative options.  But a large association would also have a 
heterogeneous population—especially if, as in some of the more recent 
proposals, an association could not exclude a high-risk applicant who otherwise 
qualified for membership.  As one of the underlying points of the association 
plan approach is to allow formation of homogeneously low-risk pools that would 
benefit from an association-specific premium, the associations that would 
emerge might be quite small, perhaps focusing on one or more lower-risk 
occupational groups.  While they might realize savings on benefit costs, savings 
on administration might be negligible. 
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Encourage health savings accounts or higher deductible plans  
 
In theory, if everyone had only some form of catastrophic coverage, the 
volume of insurance-related transactions would drop dramatically.  If the 
coverage threshold were high enough, many people would never meet it and 
would receive all their care on a cash basis.  Ultimately, however, providers 
would need to submit and payers would need to adjudicate all the sub-threshold 
claims for the minority of patients who met the threshold.  Conceivably this 
could be done retrospectively and only for those patients whose spending was 
approaching the deductible.  However, this would create situations in which 
consumers who were merrily spending their way up to, say, a $5,000 deductible 
would learn only after the fact that the insurer was going to disallow $3,000 of 
what they had already paid.  In the old indemnity world, people could keep their 
receipts in the proverbial shoebox and be confident that they would be 
compensated when the deductible was reached.  In a world of utilization 
management, high-deductible plans are likely to be tolerated only if pre-
deductible spending has already been cleared by the insurer.  This means filing 
of all claims for all participants, negating any supposed savings from reduced 
transaction volume. 
 
Once a high-deductible plan is combined with a health savings account, 
administrative costs are likely to rise.  Most current HDHP/HSA plans offer 
enrollees some assistance in tracking expenses; often the plan is linked to an 
associated financial institution that manages the account and pays out the 
enrollee’s liability as it is incurred.  All of this makes eligibility and claims 
processing transactions more, rather than less, complex.  This is one of the 
reasons for initiatives like CIGNA’s HealthePass.  If, on the other hand, 
consumers are left to manage their own finances, they will incur nonquantifiable 
administrative costs of their own, as well as possible actual financial losses from 
failure to claim appropriate reimbursement. 
 
Conclusion  
 
 Despite years of effort to simplify the administration of insurance, little is 
known about whether any of the actors—insurers, providers, or employers—
have actually seen any savings.  What Thorpe called the “black box” of 
administrative costs is still quite opaque.  Any efficiencies that have been 
achieved may be offset in future years by new complications, such as pay-for-
performance systems (with associated reporting) or health savings accounts.  
Meanwhile, little has been done to make things simpler for the fourth set of 
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actors, the consumers, although some insurers have been working to provide 
clearer explanations of benefits and other improved communications. 
 
Policymakers will need to determine what role government should play in 
pursuing simplification.  Government as regulator can mandate change, as in the 
case of HIPAA, but this built on years of private efforts, and can be seen to some 
extent as codifying rather than innovating.  Government as the largest purchaser 
of health services—through Medicare, Medicaid, FEHBP, and other programs—
can promote change by deciding what it wants to buy.  It has the greatest 
leverage with providers, but the growth of Medicare Advantage and Medicaid 
managed care gives it considerable influence on health plans as well.  Finally, 
government may need to finance change, to provide the capital and training 
needed to move hundreds of thousands of smaller providers beyond the realm of 
paper and typewriters. 
 
Meanwhile, it is important to recall that one person’s complexity is 
another person’s income.  In 2004, health plans employed 470,000 people, not 
counting independent agents and brokers (AHIP 2006b).  And there has arisen an 
entire industry of intermediaries between insurers and providers—not just 
clearinghouses, but also, for example, consultants who help providers maximize, 
and insurers minimize, claims.  None of these players are likely to wish to be 
simplified out of a job. 
 
 Ultimately, complexity is not just a byproduct of the insurance system: it 
is what insurers are selling.  The value-added of the managed care industry 
consists of the very features that make insurance complicated: different coverage 
rules and formularies, authorization requirements and careful scrutiny of claims, 
and so on.  The variations are what differentiate one plan from another, and 
competition and uniformity may be conflicting goals.   
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Appendix: Detailed Estimates of Administrative Costs 
 
This appendix provides details of the administrative cost studies 
summarized in this paper.  It should be noted that many of the tables have been 
recalculated, using data from the original sources, to improve presentation or 
ease comparison. 
 
Health plan costs 
 
The Sherlock Company conducts annual surveys of Blue Cross Blue Shield 
plans.  Plans report costs both for their insured business and for their ASO 
contracts with self-insured employers.  Table 3 shows costs by function across all 
contract types (HMO/PPO/POS, commercial/Medicare/Medicaid, etc.). 
 
Table 3.  Median Administrative Costs as Percent of Premium Equivalents, 
Blue Cross Blue Shield Plans, by Function, 2006 
Function 
Median percent of 
premium 
equivalents 
Marketing 3.0% 
Provider and medical management 1.3% 
Account and member administration 4.4% 
Corporate services 2.6% 
Total 11.9% 
Source: Sherlock Company. 
Note: Premium equivalents include premiums for insured plans and the sum of ASO charges and 
benefit payments for self-insured plans.  The marketing function includes rating and 
underwriting, as well as broker commissions and other marketing costs. 
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Table 4 shows costs by type of business. 
 
Table 4.  Median Administrative Costs as Percent of Premium Equivalents, 
Blue Cross Blue Shield Plans, by Line of Business, 2006 
Plan type 
Median percent 
of premium 
equivalents 
Commercial HMO  
Insured 14.3% 
ASO/ASC 8.5% 
Commercial POS  
Insured 13.9% 
ASO/ASC 8.9% 
Indemnity & PPO  
Insured 15.0% 
ASO/ASC 8.6% 
Medicare Advantage 8.1% 
Medicaid 13.8% 
Medicare Supplemental 17.2% 
Comprehensive Total 11.9% 
  
Stand Alone Dental 18.5% 
Medicare Part D 20.4% 
Source: Sherlock Company. 
Note: Premium equivalents include premiums for insured plans and the sum of ASO charges and 
benefit payments for self-insured plans.  The marketing function includes rating and 
underwriting, as well as broker commissions and other marketing costs. 
 
 McKinsey & Company has also used Blue Cross Blue Shield Data, 
breaking it into a larger number of functional components, but presenting each 
component as a share of administrative costs rather than total premiums.16  
Within components, they estimate the percent of the activities that may be 
considered as related to marketing and underwriting. 
 
                                                 
16 Sherlock Company provides even more detailed functional categories, but only to paid 
subscribers. 
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Table 5.  Distribution of Administrative Costs as a Percent of Premiums by 
Function, Blue Cross Blue Shield Plans, 2004 
 Total 
Marketing and underwriting
related 
Sales and marketing 37% 37% 
Customer service 8% 4% 
Medical management 7% 0% 
Actuarial 2% 2% 
IT 20% 10% 
Management/overhead 17% 11% 
Claims 7% 0% 
HIPAA/government 2% 0% 
Total 100% 64% 
Source: McKinsey & Company 
 
 Kahn et al. use data from commercial insurers surveyed by Milliman USA.  
Overall costs are smaller than those reported by the Blues, but this may reflect a 
different distribution of enrollment among lines of business. 
 
Table 6.  Administrative Costs as a Percent of Premiums, Commercial Insurers, 
1996-2001 
Function 
Percent of 
premiums 
Claims billing/payment 2% 
Sales & marketing 2% 
Finance & underwriting 1% 
Membership & billing 0% 
Provider services & credentialing 1% 
Customer service 1% 
Information systems 1% 
Medical (UR, case management, etc.) 2% 
General administration 1% 
Total 10% 
Source: Kahn et al., based on data from Milliman USA 
Note: Sales and marketing does not include payments to brokers. 
 
 Actuarial Research Corporation collected data on small group costs from 
insurers’ reports to state insurance departments in two states.  Although their 
report includes averages, they are unweighted and hence not very helpful; table 
8 instead uses minimum and maximum values for each component.  Note that 
this is the only table in the section that includes offsets from investment income 
and profits/risk reserves.  The generally higher costs in Colorado are chiefly 
driven by higher agent/broker commissions. 
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 Table 7. Administrative Expenses and Profit as Percent of Premiums, Small 
Group Carriers in West Virginia and Colorado, Various Years, 1999-2002 
West Virginia Colorado 
 Minimum Maximum Minimum Maximum 
General administration 10% 12% 9% 14% 
Commissions 2% 5% 4% 21% 
Taxes and license fees 2% 5% 2% 4% 
Investment income -3% 0% -3% -1% 
Profit and contingency 2% 6% 3% 8% 
Total administrative expenses 20% 30% 21% 38% 
Source: Actuarial Research Corporation, based on filings with state insurance departments. 
Note: Small groups in West Virginia had 2-50 employees; Colorado includes groups of one.  
Components do not sum to totals, because an insurer that reported the minimum 
expense in one category might not have the minimum in all categories 
 
 Pauly and Nichols (2002), using data from insurers’ filings with state 
insurance commissioners, report that administrative costs and profit for 
nongroup carriers range from 30% to 40% of premiums.  They note that these 
costs dropped during the 1990s and that the gap between nongroup and group 
administrative loadings narrowed during the same period. 
Physicians 
 
Two studies, nine years apart, use data from the Medical Group 
Management Association to estimate physician administrative costs.  Kahn et al. 
estimate the share of insurance-related costs within non-insurance functional 
components and include physician’s time; Sheils, Young, and Rubin do not.  
Note that the Kahn estimates shown are for primary care practices; the figures 
for single-specialty surgical groups are lower, perhaps because comparable 
administrative spending is measured against higher practice revenue. 
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Table 8.  Billing and Insurance-Related Costs as a Percent of Practice 
Revenues, Physicians in Single-Specialty Primary Care Practice, Western US, 
2000 
Function 
Percent of 
practice 
revenue 
Claims billing/payment 4% 
Medical receptionists 2% 
Managed care admin. 1% 
Information technology 1% 
Med. secretaries/transcribers 0% 
Medical records 0% 
Providers (insurance-related activities) 4% 
All other billing and insurance-related 3% 
Non-BIR administrative 12% 
Total 27% 
Source: Kahn et al.  Totals based on data from Medical Group Management Association; 
allocation to billing-related functions from various sources. 
 
 
Table 9.  Physician Administrative Costs as Percent of Net Revenues, US, 1991  
General administration 13% 
Marketing, interest, and other expenses 8% 
Claims filing, billing 6% 
Claims adjudication 2% 
Utilization management 1% 
Utilization review 1% 
Facilities and equipment 2% 
  
Total 32% 
Source : Sheils, Young, and Rubin, based on 1990 data from Medical Group Management 
Association. 
 
Hospitals 
 
The available studies are again Kahn et al. and Sheils, Young, and Rubin, 
with the same differences in methodology and time frames as for the physician 
estimates.  Kahn et al. found allocation of costs to insurance-related functions 
more difficult for hospitals than for physicians and report low to high ranges for 
some components. 
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Table 10. Billing and Insurance-Related Costs as Percent of Revenues, 
California Hospitals, 1999  
Claims billing/payment 3% 
Admitting 1% 
Outpatient registration 0% 
Utilization management 1% 
Medical records 0% 
All other administrative 2%-6% 
Non-BIR administrative 10%-14% 
Total 21% 
Source: Kahn et al., authors’ estimated allocations of data from California Office of Statewide 
Health Planning and Development. 
 
Table 11.  Hospital Administrative Costs as Percent of Net Revenues, 
California, 1991 
Patient accounting/collections 3% 
Patient admitting 1% 
General accounting and other 
fiscal services 2% 
All other 29% 
Total administration 33% 
Source: Sheils, Young, and Rubin, based on data from California Office of Statewide Health 
Planning and Development 
 
International comparison 
 
Woolhandler and various colleagues have been offering comparisons of 
US and Canadian administrative costs for many years.  Table 13 is drawn from 
the most recent of these studies.  The insurance estimate for the US merges 
private, Medicare, and Medicaid costs.  The US hospital and physician estimates 
are comparable to the totals reported in the other studies cited here, but do not 
include any functional breakout.  So there is no way of knowing whether the 
lower costs in Canada reflect less insurance-related activity or less of other 
administrative activities. 
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Table 12.  Costs of Health Care Administration as percent of total spending, 
1999 
 US Canada 
Insurance overhead/total health spending 6% 2% 
Hospital administration/total hospital spending 24% 13% 
Physician time and administrative costs/total physician income 27% 16% 
Total insurer, employer, and provider administration/total health 
spending 31% 17% 
Source: Woolhandler, Campbell, and Himmelstein 
 
Aaron (2003) has noted: “Canadian regulation of physicians’ fees and the 
use of global budgets to control hospital spending make it likely that more of this 
added bang for the Canadian buck arises because Canada is squeezing the 
salaries of doctors, who have few opportunities outside the health care sector, 
rather than the salaries of secretaries and accountants, who can easily find work 
anywhere in the economy.”  Aaron also criticizes, on several grounds, the 
authors’ presentation of the differences as dollar amounts.  For this reason, the 
estimates have been recalculated as percentages in this table. 
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